On December 24, 2018 a Party Statement was filed involving a dispute between Bayview Loan Servicing Llc , Jpmorgan Chase Bank Na , and Bimini Village Condominium Association Inc , Jpmorgan Chase Bank National Association , Stainkamp, Clint , Stainkamp, Robert John , Wynmoor Community Council Inc , for Real Prop Non-Homestead Res Fore - $0 - $50,000 in the District Court of Broward County.
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Filing# 140292490 E-Filed 12/13/2021 06:09:12 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Case #: 2018-CA-029453 DIVISION: 11 Plaintiff, -VS.- Unknown Heirs, Devisees, Grantees, Assignees, Creditors, Lienors, and Trustees of Richard Stainkamp a/k/a Francis Stainkamp, Deceased, and All Other Persons Claiming by and Through, Under, Against The Named Defendant (s);et al. Defendant(s). ATTORNEY'S AFFIDAVIT OF POST JUDGMENT ADVANCES AND POST JUDGMENT INTEREST STATE OF FLORIDA: :SS COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public,this date appeared, Affiant,being personallyknown to me and having taken oath, deposes and says: Affiant is a practicingattorney at LOGS Legal Group LLP, licensed to practicelaw in Florida and is the attorney for the Plaintiff,JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in this cause. Affiant makes this affidavit based on personalknowledge as to the costs advanced or anticipatedto be advanced on behalf of the Plaintiffand attorneys fees incurred by the Plaintiff by a review ofthe Plaintiffs counsel's internal case management system. Post judgment interest is included within the affidavit at the statutory rate. Based on a review ofthe internal case management system, Plaintiffs counsel expended or will expend the followingcosts and incurred the followingattorneys fees in the action, subsequent to the entry of final judgment. I *** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 12/13/2021 06:09:12 PM.**** Clerk's Sale Fee $295.00 Notice of Sale Amount $490.00 Post Judgment Interest $969.42 Post Judgment Attorney Fees $500.00 Re-Open Cost $0.00 Title Update $55.00 Total Advances: $2,309.42 FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. Affiant The foregoinginstrument was acknowledged before me by means of [X] physical presence or [] online notarization,thisCase Info
Document Filed DateDecember 13, 2021
Case Filing DateDecember 24, 2018
Real Prop Non-Homestead Res Fore - $0 - $50,000
Parties
Jan 26, 2024 | Hilal, Jennifer Wigand | Real Property/Mortgage Foreclosure $1 - $15,000 | COCE24005770
Nov 22, 2023 | Mollica, Kim Theresa | Real Property/Mortgage Foreclosure $15,001 - $30,000 | CONO23007886
Case Number: 23VECV00091 Hearing Date: September 11, 2024 Dept: W ROBIN LA DUE vs SHAHE BOYADIJAN, et al. defendants MOTION TO DISMISS FOR PLAINTIFFS FAILURE TO AMEND FOLLOWING SUSTAINING OF DEMURRER Date of Hearing: Sept. 11, 2024 Trial Date: None Set Department: W Case No.: 23VECV00091 Moving Party: Plaintiff Robin La Due Responding Party: Shahe Boyadjian and Maral Boyadjian BACKGROUND On January 9, 2023, Plaintiff Robin La Due filed a complaint against Defendants Shahe Boyadjian and Maral Boyadjian. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on August 24, 2023 for Breach of Contract, Stolen Property, and Malicious Sabotage. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on January 8, 2024, adding a cause of action for Fraud on the Court. The parties have a history of litigation between them that began prior to Plaintiffs filing the instant action. In January 2022, Boyadjian filed a small claims action against Robin La Due to recover unpaid rent. Judgment was ultimately entered in favor of Boyadjian, against La Due. On June 21, 2022, Boyadjian filed an unlawful detainer action against Robin La Due, stemming from his longstanding unjustified failure to pay rent at the subject property, in violation of the lease agreement. That matter was also fully litigated and resulted in another judgment in favor of Boyadjian, against La Due. Following those two actions by Boyadjian, Plaintiff subsequently brought two civil actions against the Boyadjians. In this action, Plaintiff alleges Defendants did not properly give Plaintiff enough time to vacate the premises upon the Sheriffs arrival, resulting in their leaving behind certain personal property at the unit, which Defendants have refused to return. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant withheld Plaintiffs security deposit. On April 30, 2024, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted on June 10, 2024. The court ordered plaintiffs complaint dismissed with prejudice as plaintiff failed to amend the complaint within the time allowed by the court, as required by C.C.P. Section 581(f). While dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 581(f) is discretionary, any such dismissal must be with prejudice. (Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 330.) No cases have held that a dismissal pursuant to section 581, subdivision (f)(2) may be without prejudice. The right to dismiss without prejudice is expressly permitted by other subdivisions of section 581 but section 581, subdivision (f)(2) does not so provide.¿(Id. at 229.) Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss and the case was dismissed. Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of that order. [Tentative] Ruling Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. DISCUSSION Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration on June 21, 2024. It cannot fairly be construed as a motion for reconsideration, as it does not comply with the requirements of C.C.P. Section 1008, namely that the motion be based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law. Rather, this motion is in truth a motion for relief from error pursuant to C.C.P. 473(b), which provides in pertinent part: The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Plaintiff asserts that he should be relieved of his mistake in failing to file the amended complaint because he is self-represented and is burdened by the care of his mother and other responsibilities. While this court is sensitive to the difficulties of appearing without counsel and the financial and personal difficulties plaintiff alleges, plaintiff must still conform to the legal requirements for the motions he brings. He has not complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 473(b) that he submit a copy of the amended complaint with the motion for relief. As that section makes clear: the [a]pplication for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted. But even had such a document been filed, the court would not find an adequate basis for relief. Plaintiff knew that he had to file the amended complaint by April 29, 2024. He was in court when the order was issued. Further, he filed a declaration on April 26, 2024, informing the court that he had no intention of filing the amended complaint, as he had been ordered. He informed the court that the case was not going anywhere, and he wanted to stop wasting the time of everyone involved. (La Due Declaration filed April 26, 2024.) Given this admission that he knew he was obligated to file the amended complaint and he elected not to at the time, either because he thought it was a waste of time or thought he would not get a fair hearing, the court does not find his subsequent change of heart entitled to the relief contemplated for true mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. The deliberate decision to not file a pleading despite a court order and deadline, is not excusable neglect, nor can it be deemed a true mistake or surprise. The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Case Number: BC666284 Hearing Date: September 10, 2024 Dept: 57 Lawrence D. Quinn and Olivia Saunders (collectively Quinn/Saunders) own real properties in Los Angeles that abut real property owned by Kenneth and Kevin Lorenzo (the Lorenzos), which the Lorenzos purchased from Bay Harbor Investment Property (Bay Harbor). In 2017, Quinn/Saunders sued the Lorenzos and Bay Harbor asserting claims for private nuisance and negligence based on allegations that an allegedly faulty retaining wall located on the Lorenzos property had caused cracking in Quinn/Saunders properties. The case proceeded to trial. Quinn/Saunders did not pay the required jury trial fees. Nor did the Lorenzos or Bay Harbor. The Court conducted a bench trial over a few days in December 2019 and then again over a few days a year later, in December 2020. Following the bench trial, this Court (per Judge Steven Kleifield) issued a statement of decision in favor of the Lorenzos and Bay Harbor and against Quinn/Saunders and then entered a judgment along those lines on February 8, 2021 Quinn/Saunders appealed from the judgment. On August 1, 2023, the Court of Appeal issued a decision that affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court of Appeal affirmed this Courts ruling in the statement of decision that Section 366 of the Restatement of Torts, which deals with unreasonably dangerous conditions on real property, did not apply to the retaining wall on the Lorenzos property. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the part of this Courts decision in which the Court expressly refrained from determining whether the retaining wall was causing cracking on the Quinn/Saunders properties. The Courts decision refraining from making that determination was based on the premise that it was unnecessary to reach causation issues because neither Bay Harbor nor the Lorenzos were involved in the construction of the retaining wall. The Court of Appeal rejected that premise. It directed that, [o]n remand, the trial court is to determine whether Quinn/Saunders have proven the elements necessary to recover under their private nuisance and negligence theories. On remand, this Court set the case for a retrial. Quinn/Saunders demanded a jury trial time this around, not a bench trial, and paid jury fees. The Lorenzos have moved to strike that demand on the ground that Quinn/Saunders waived their right to a jury trial at the initial trial and this right was not revived by the Court of Appeals decision and remand order. (Bay Harbor did not join in the Lorenzos motion because it has been dissolved and no longer exists.) The Court agrees with the Lorenzos and is denying Quinn/Saunders demand for a jury trial. As a procedural matter, the Court rejects Quinn/Sanders contention that the Lorenzos motion to strike is improper under Code of Civil Procedure Section 435. Section 435 governs motions to strike a pleading or portions of a pleading and sets forth a strict time limit on when such motions may be filed. Here, as Quinn/Saunders observe, the Lorenzos motion does not seek the striking of any pleading of Quinn/Saunders and was filed long after the statutory deadline. Quinn/Saunders overlook, however, that the Lorenzos have not filed their motion to strike under Section 435. More importantly, that the motion is denominated as a motion to strike is beside the point. The Lorenzos could have (and perhaps should have) called it a motion to deny Quinn/Saunders jury trial demand, which is what the motion is essentially asking this Court to do. All told, Section 435 has no bearing on the Lorenzos motion. Turning to the substance of the motion, the Court finds that Quinn/Saunders waived their right to a jury trial at the first trial under Section 631. Section 631(a) states [i]n civil cases, a jury may only be waived pursuant to subdivision (f). In turn, and as relevant here, Section 631(f) provides that [a] party may waive jury trial in . . . the following ways . . . (4) By failing to announce that a jury is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice or stipulation, or within five days after notice of setting if it is set without notice or stipulation. (5) By failing to timely pay the fee described in subdivision (b), unless another party on the same side of the case has paid that fee . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 631(f) (4), (5) Applying these provisions here, Quinn/Saunders waived their right to a jury trial in the following ways. First, the record shows that the case was set for a bench trial and Quinn/Saunders acquiesced to that mode of trial. This constituted a Section 631(f)(4) waiver of their right to a jury trial. ( Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 713 fn. 12; see also City of Los Angeles v. Zeller (1917) 176 Cal. 194, 199 [[W]here parties appear and go to trial without objection before a court, they will be deemed to have waived a trial by jury].) Second, Quinn/Saunders did not pay the required jury fees at any time prior to the initial trial in this action. This failure constituted a Section 631(f)(5) waiver of their right to jury trial. ( State of Cal. ex rel. Rapier v. Encino Hospital Medical Center (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 811, 834-835.) This raises the question whether Quinn/Saunders waiver of their right to a jury trial at the initial trial carries over to the retrial that the Court of Appeal has directed to take place on remand. The answer to this turns on the nature of the retrial that was ordered. It has long been settled that parties are not bound by a waiver of their right to a jury trial at an initial trial when the judgment following that trial is reversed for a trial de novo . Such a reversal revives the right to a jury trial that had been waived because [t]he cause of action stands as if it had never gone to trial and the parties are restored to their original positions and rights. ( Spaulding v. Cameron (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 698, 701.) By contrast, where the cause is remanded for further proceedings and the determination of issues that could have been decided originally, a waiver of jury trail is binding as to the subsequent proceedings. ( Id . at p. 702.) In Spaulding itself, both sides waived their right to a jury trial in a case, much like this one, involving an alleged nuisance causing damage to real property; the case proceeded to a bench trial. The judgment entered following the bench trial was reversed on appeal with instructions that a retrial should occur on a factual issue regarding whether the alleged nuisance was permanent or could be abated. That issue had not been determined at the bench trial. ( Spaulding , supra , 127 Cal.App.2d at p. 703.) On remand, the trial court conducted a bench trial over the objection of the defendant who claimed he was entitled to a jury trial. The defendant lost at the bench trial and appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the remand for a trial regarding the nature of the nuisance did not restore the defendants right to a jury trial that he had waived at the initial bench trial because that issue could have been determined at the initial trial. ( Ibid ). Applying the principles of Spaulding here, the Court concludes that the retrial that the Court of Appeal ordered was not for a trial de novo. Rather, it was for a retrial on issues of causation on Quinn/Saunders nuisance and negligence theories related to the retaining wall on the Lorenzos party that could have been decided originally at the bench trial but that this Court (erroneously, in the Court of Appeals view) refrained from deciding. Given the limited nature of the retrial that was ordered, the Court of Appeals remand did not restore Quinn/Saunders right to a jury that they waived at the first trial, and their demand for a jury trial at the retrial is denied. The retrial will proceed as a bench trial, just like the initial trial did.
Case Number: 23AHCV01728 Hearing Date: September 17, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS I. INTRODUCTION On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff Deeson Pan (Plaintiff or Pan), in propria persona, filed an action against Defendant Xuesong Guan (Defendant or Guan) and Does 1 through 10 for (1) breach of contract, (2) constructive fraud, (3) negligent misrepresentation of facts, (4) unfair business practice in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., and (5) unfair competition law, Business and Professions Code section 17204. The action arises out of an alleged dispute related to the property located at 1420 S. Del Mar Ave, Unit #6, San Gabriel, California 91776. Plaintiff alleges that he is the rightful owner of the property. Defendant has rented the property and has been collecting and retaining rent from tenants residing at the property, without Plaintiffs approval. On August 24, 2023, Defendant, in propria persona, filed an Answer to the Complaint. After retaining counsel, on June 4, 2024, Defendant filed an Amended Answer with the Courts approval. On July 15, 2024, the Court granted Defendants Motion to Have Requests for Admission Deemed Admitted as to Plaintiff, filed on April 29, 2024. The Court found that Defendant had served Plaintiff with Requests for Admission on January 23, 2024, but Plaintiff failed to serve any responses. Thus, the Court granted the Motion and Defendants request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,500. On August 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Sanctions. Defendant filed an Opposition on September 6, 2024, and Plaintiff filed a Reply on September 12, 2024. On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside and Vacate and Enter Another and Different Judgment in response to the Courts July 15, 2024, order. The hearing is set for September 18, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 permits a trial court to order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a).) Actions or tactics include, but are not limited to, filing or opposing motions, complaints, answers, or other responsive pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5, subd. (b)(1).) Frivolous means totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party. (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5, subd. (b)(2).) Bad faith is determined using a subjective standard. ( In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 139, 134-35.) Expenses pursuant to § 128.5 cannot be imposed unless noticed in a partys moving or responding papers, or on the courts own motion after providing the offending party notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (c).) An order imposing expenses must be in writing and must recite in detail the action, tactic, or circumstances justifying the order. ( Id. ) Sanctions under this section may also be awarded if the offending party is provided a 21-day safe harbor to withdraw or correct its offending document or pleading. Specifically, [ i ]f the alleged action or tactic is the making or opposing of a written motion or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading that can be withdrawn or appropriately corrected, the court on its own motion may enter an order describing the specific action or tactic, made in bad faith, that is frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, and direct an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has made an action or tactic as defined in subdivision (b), unless, within 21 days of service of the order to show cause, the challenged action or tactic is withdrawn or appropriately corrected. (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(D)(1).) An award of sanctions may include an award of attorneys fees incurred as a direct result of the offending partys bath faith action or tactic. (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(D)(2).) III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff moves for an order imposing sanctions in the amount of $1,630 against Defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has engaged in bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay by filing a Motion to Have Requests for Admission Deemed Admitted despite having received the responses to Requests for Admission (RFAs). (Mot. pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff states that on February 20, 2024, he submitted responses to the RFAs served by Defendant, two days before the deadline. (Pan Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Plaintiff has attached proof of service indicating that the responses were served by mail and email on Defendant at 4907 Willmonte Ave, Temple City, California 91780, on February 20, 2024. ( Ibid. ) At the time of submission, he was not aware that verification was required by the Code of Civil Procedure; however, his lack of knowledge was not intentional, and he would have corrected his error if he was informed. ( Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5.) Plaintiff fully intends to comply with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure and does not wish to unnecessarily prolong the proceedings. ( Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff argues that before moving to have matters in requests for admission admitted, the requesting party must provide the responding party with a reasonable opportunity to correct a deficiency. (Mot. p. 3.) Here, Defendant did not provide such an opportunity and prematurely filed the Motion to Have Requests for Admission Deemed Admitted. ( Id. at pp. 3-4.) Thus, Defendants' conduct exemplifies a deliberate strategy to hinder and obstruct the resolution of this case and harass Plaintiff. ( Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff is requesting reasonable expenses in the amount of $1,630 for document preparation services and time for researching and looking for files. (Mot. p. 7.) In opposition, Defendant presents the following evidence. Defendants former counsel served Plaintiff with RFAs on January 23, 2024. (Andion Decl. ¶ 3.) Former counsel was substituted out on February 7, 2024, and new counsel was substituted in on February 27, 2024. ( Ibid. ) After being retained, new counsel, James Andion, reviewed the case file and observed that Plaintiff had not responded to the RFAs. ( Ibid. ) Thus, he filed the Motion to Have Requests for Admission Deemed Admitted . ( Ibid. ) Plaintiff did not respond to the motion and at the hearing on July 15, 2024, he did not raise the claim that he had served the responses, thus, the Court granted the Motion. ( Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.) On August 27, 2024, Defendant discovered that she had received an email from Plaintiff on February 20, 2024, with PDF files containing discovery responses. ( Id. ¶ 8.) The email was from an address that Defendant did not recognize and assumed was junk mail. ( Ibid. ) The responses were not verified and only contained objections, and the proof of service indicated that the responses had also been mailed to an address that was not Defendants address of record. ( Ibid. ) Defendant denies that she received these responses by mail. ( Ibid. ) Defendant also requests attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $1,500 for preparing the instant Opposition and traveling to the hearing on the Motion. (Andion Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failure to serve compliant responses was due to his own neglect. Moreover, Plaintiff did not file an opposition or raise any arguments at the hearing on July 15, 2024. If Plaintiff had indeed intended to comply with his discovery obligations, he would have responded to the motion and served another copy of his discovery responses. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff did not properly serve the instant Motion for Sanctions, as counsel discovered it upon checking the Courts website. Thus, Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions is unsupported and made in bad faith. In his Reply, Plaintiff argues that objections to discovery do not need to be verified. Moreover, Defendant was aware of Plaintiffs responses prior to retaining new counsel and instead of filing a motion to provide verified responses, Defendant deceived the Court by stating that she did not receive any responses. Defendants admission that she received the responses reflects malice and shows she intentionally sought to sanction Plaintiff. The Court makes the following findings. Plaintiff presents evidence that on February 20, 2024, he served responses to Defendants RFAs, propounded on January 23, 2024. The responses only contained objections to RFAs #1-37 and did not need to be verified pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.240, subdivision (a). Plaintiff sent the responses directly to Defendant by email and by mail to 4907 Willmonte Ave, Temple City, CA 91780. The Court finds that the discovery responses were not properly served on Defendant. First, between February 7, 2024, and February 27, 2024, Defendant was self-represented, and the Substitution of Attorney form indicates that Defendants address was 1420 S. Del Mar, San Gabriel, CA 91776. Plaintiff did not serve the discovery responses by mail to this address. Second, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, a self-represented party may only be served by electronic transmission after expressly consenting to receive service by email. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Defendant had consented to service by email. Moreover, the Court notes that a party moving to deem RFAs admitted is under no obligation to meet and confer regarding missing or defective responses and Plaintiff has not cited to any authority to show otherwise. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs argument that Defendant proceeded to file the motion to deem requests for admission admitted, despite receiving responses, is without merit. The Court also notes that Plaintiff had an opportunity to file an opposition to the motion demonstrating that it acted with substantial justification in failing to properly serve the discovery responses, but despite being aware of the Motion and attending the hearing, Plaintiff did not raise any opposing arguments. Given that on July 15, 2024, the Court granted Defendants Motion to Have RFAs Deemed Admitted and Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to show that Defendants Motion was frivolous, filed in bad faith, or with the intention to cause unnecessary delay, the Court does not find that sanctions are warranted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. Furthermore, the Court does not find that the instant Motion for Sanctions was filed in bad faith or with the intention to cause delay and denies Defendants request for additional sanctions against Plaintiff. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiff Deeson Pans Motion for Sanctions is DENIED. Dated: September 17, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Case Number: 22STCV27008 Hearing Date: September 13, 2024 Dept: 32 JANE DHILLON, Plaintiff, v. 8715 BURTON TOWER, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV27008 Hearing Date: September 13, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motions to compel plaintiffs experts to appear for deposition BACKGROUND On August 19, 2022, Plaintiff Jane Dhillon filed this action against Defendants 8715 Burton Tower, Inc. and A-Ju Realty, Inc., asserting causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (4) constructive eviction, and (5) violation of L.A. Municipal Code section 45.33. On August 16, 2024, Defendants filed the instant two motions to compel Plaintiffs experts, Drs. Shakil Saghir and Ronald Simons, to appear for deposition. Plaintiff filed her oppositions on August 30, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on September 6, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD On receipt of an expert witness list from a party, any other party may take the deposition of any person on the list. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.410.) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action . . . without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination . . . or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document & described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(a).) DISCUSSION I. Factual Background On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff served her Expert Witness Designation, designating Drs. Saghir and Simon as experts to testify on the causation of Plaintiffs injuries. (Kirschen Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.) On May 13, 2024, Defendants served a Notice of Taking Expert Deposition on Plaintiff, scheduling the depositions of Drs. Saghir and Simons for May 28, 2024. ( Id. , ¶ 5, Ex. B.) Because Plaintiff failed to produce all of the documents requested in the deposition notice, the deposition could not proceed on the scheduled date. ( Id. , ¶ 6.) After Plaintiff did not agree to produce the experts for deposition prior to the original trial date of June 11, 2024, the trial was continued to October 15, 2024. ( Ibid. ) On July 1, 2024, Defendants served a second Notice of Taking Expert Deposition, scheduling the depositions of Drs. Saghir and Simons for July 24, 2024. (Kirschen Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. D.) On July 19, 2024, Plaintiff notified Defendants that the depositions could not occur on July 24, 2024 due to the recent withdrawal of her counsel. ( Id. , Ex. E.) Plaintiff requested a continuance of the depositions and the trial. ( Ibid. ) Defendants initially refused to continue the depositions, but after Plaintiff reiterated that she was attempting to seek new counsel and had not yet received her case file from her prior attorney, Defendants asked Plaintiff to provide alternative dates by July 23, 2024. ( Ibid. ) On July 23, 2024, Plaintiff responded that she was still attempting to acquire new counsel and her case file, and proposed a deposition date of November 24, 2024 and a continued trial date of February 15, 2025. ( Ibid. ) Defendants responded that this was unacceptable because the deposition date would be after the current trial date, and the trial could not be continued any further. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiffs new counsel substituted in on August 16, 2024. (Stupak Decl. ¶ 4.) That day, Plaintiffs counsel wrote to request a meet and confer to resolve the instant motions. ( Id. , Ex. 1.) Plaintiffs counsel met and conferred with defense counsel on August 22, 2024 via Zoom. ( Id. , ¶ 5.) On August 28, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel notified defense counsel that the experts would be available on September 16, 2024. ( Id. , Ex. 2.) II. Premature Plaintiff argues that the motions are premature because the expert designation deadline was extended to August 26, 2024, and the expert discovery cutoff is September 30, 2024. However, an expert deposition may be taken [o]n receipt of an expert witness list from a party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.410.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff served her expert designations on May 6, 2024. (See Kirschen Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Therefore, Defendants were entitled to depose the listed witnesses at any point afterwards. Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that Defendants must wait until the expert designation deadline or discovery cutoff. Therefore, the motion is not premature. III. Meet and Confer A motion to compel deposition must be accompanied by a declaration demonstrating an effort to meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(b)(2).) The record above shows that Defendants met and conferred with Plaintiff after each of the two deposition notices in May and July 2024. Plaintiffs new counsel also confirms that Defendants met and conferred over Zoom after the recent substitution in August 2024. (Stupak Decl. ¶ 5.) Therefore, Defendants have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. IV. Mootness Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the motions are moot because she has since confirmed that her experts are available for deposition on September 16, 2024. (See Stupak Decl., Ex. 2.) However, the deposition notices were first served back in May 2024. After months of delay, an order compelling the depositions is warranted to ensure timely discovery. CONCLUSION Defendants motions to compel deposition are GRANTED. Dr. Shakil Saghir is ordered to appear for deposition on September 16, 2024 at 10am. Dr. Ronald Simons is ordered to appear for deposition on September 16, 2024 at 2pm. Deponents shall produce all documents requested in the deposition notices. Sanctions are denied as the parties acted with substantial justification.